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ANTHONY JOSEPH DURAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20090943 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Burglary, a 1st degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2009) and Theft, a 3rd degree felony in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, in the Second Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Ernie M. Jones, Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow the jury to determine the 
existence of the habitual violent offender enhancement. 
Issue II: Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for 
mistrial based on the improper comments of the police regarding the defendant's criminal 
history and his invocation of the right to remain silent. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
"A trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial will not be reversed absent an 
abuse of discretion." State v. Wach. 2001 UT 35,5 45,24 P.3d 948. 
These issues were preserved by Mr. Duran, who filed a motion for mistrial. (R. 
245-46.) One of Mr. Duran's contentions was not preserved in the motion for mistrial, 
but Mr. Duran contends this issue may be reviewed for plain error. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI and XIV, Utah Const. Art. I 
§ 7 and § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5,76-6-202 and 76-6-404 (2009); Utah R. 
Evid. 403,404 and 609. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated December 5,2007, the State charged Anthony Duran 
("Appellant," "Tony," "Duran") in an amended information with two counts of Burglary, 
a 1st degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2009) and two counts of 
Theft, a 3rd degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. 
From March 23-26,2009, the case was heard in a jury trial. On March 26,2009, 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty on counts 3 and 4 of the information and indicated 
that it was hung on counts 1 and 2. On October 6,2009, Mr. Duran was sentenced by the 
Honorable Judge Ernie W. Jones to a prison term of 5 years to life on count 3 and zero to 
five years on count 4. Mr. Duran filed a timely notice of appeal on November 2,2009. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On June 28,2007 between 6-7 a.m., Tegan Greenfield walked outside of her home 
in order to plant some flowers. (R. 362:55.) She noticed a Ford Bronco II parked inside 
her driveway; it had not been there the night before. (R. 362:55-56.) At 7:26 am, she 
called the police, giving them the license plate number, while she looked around in the 
car. (R. 362:57,71.) She noticed the car was piled full of things: throw pillows, boy's 
decor, etc. (R. 362:57.) As Ms. Greenfield looked through the vehicle, she saw a larger 
male with broad shoulders wearing darker colored clothing and a baseball cap sprint 
across her yard and into the Bronco. (R. 362:60-61,68, 84.) This individual seemed to be 
older, she testified, and was wearing baggy-style clothing. (R. 362:60, 85-86.) She was 
not able to see his face or observe any other details about his appearance. (R. 362:69, 87.) 
Early that same morning, Ms. Greenfield's neighbor across the street, Sarah 
Olivieri observed a person walking through her yard. (R. 362:90.) She asked whether she 
could help the individual and he raised his hand and continued walking. (R. 362:93.) She 
asked him whether he was the reason that car alarms were going off; he replied not to 
worry about it. (R. 362:94.) She told him to "get the hell out of my yard" and threatened 
to call the police. (R. 362:94.) Ms. Olivieri was unable to see his face or even recall any 
clothing he was wearing. (R. 362:91,92,100.) 
Officer Camryn Youngberg from the Ogden City Police department responded to 
Ms. Greenfield's call. (R. 363:68.) While there, he was informed over the radio that the 
vehicle had been located at 1391 Kingston. (R. 363:69.) This was around 8:00 am. (R. 
1
 The defendant was not found guilty of counts 3 and 4 alleged to have occurred at 1391 
Kingston. As a result, he will only briefly explain the facts surrounding that incident in 
order to give a context to the subsequent counts. 
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365: 14.) The officer went to that location and noticed the home had signs of a break in 
and contacted the owner, James Pierce. (R. 363:69-70.) 
Between 7:30 and 8:00 am, James Pierce received a call from the police informing 
him that his house at 1391 Kingston may have been broken into. (R. 362:102-03.) When 
he arrived home, he noticed a Ford Bronco II parked in his driveway, which he had never 
seen before. (R. 362:104-05.) Inside his home, clothes had been strewn about and a 
backpack filled with popcorn, binoculars and cameras was in the living room. (R. 
362:109-10.) A sliding glass door had been broken, with a hole in the glass the size of a 
fist. (R. 362:110-11.) An open can of Dr. Pepper was sitting on the counter. (R. 362:113.) 
A glove was also found on the fence in the backyard which did not belong to Mr. Pierce, 
though this glove was on the neighbor's side of the fence. (R. 362:114-15, 125.) The only 
thing Mr. Pierce could find missing from his home was a New York Yankees baseball 
cap which was grey with a black bill. (R. 362:117.) That cap was never located. (R. 
362:122-23.) 
Officer Youngberg impounded the Ford Bronco II and fingerprinted it at the 
scene. (R. 363:73,78.) None of the property in the vehicle came from Mr. Pierce's home. 
(R. 363:78.) Though he did find some pink gauze tape, gauze and a meth pipe in the 
Bronco. (R. 363:79.) 
At around 8:32 am, police received information that a person was seen walking at 
3639 Iowa and an open door was found at that home at 8:46 a.m. (R. 365:14-15.) Police 
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began investigating a potential burglary at this second location, eventually finding a 
broken window on the 3639 Iowa property2. (R. 69:82-83.) 
Officer Trent Jensen of the South Ogden Police force was listening to his radio 
and heard the description of a male in dark clothing wearing a baseball cap as a potential 
burglary suspect. (R. 364:8.) As he heard this description, he observed an individual 
running between homes who fit this description "to a T." (R. 364:9-10.) The officer 
attempted to follow the person on foot, checking through backyards in the area. (R. 
364:11-12.) He came to a field and spoke with three gentlemen working on a roof who 
indicated they had seen a man running westbound about 10-15 minutes prior. (R. 364:14-
15.) The officer was attempting to locate this individual when police radioed that they 
had captured a suspect. (R. 364:17-18.) 
Rich Clawson of the Weber State University police force testified that as he was 
driving in the area, he observed a male running northbound from 36th and Iowa who 
almost ran into his police car. (R. 364:39.) He watched the individual run from his police 
car and across Harrison Boulevard. (R. 364:40.) At this point, Officer Nathan Cline was 
driving towards the burglary locations when he observed an individual running west 
across Harrison. (R. 364:64.) He was wearing a gray t-shirt with yellow stripes, dark 
jeans, white tennis shoes, a beanie and sunglasses. (R. 364:103.) The individual was 
running fast, looking over his shoulder, like he was running away from something. (R. 
364:66.) The officer cut the individual off and ordered him to the ground. (R. 364:68-69.) 
The individual, who turned out to be the defendant, Tony Duran, did not comply with that 
2
 The trial transcript was missing nearly 15 minutes of Officer David Gentry's testimony. 
For purposes of this appeal, Mr. Duran assumes that Officer Gentry's testimony would 
conform to what he said at the preliminary hearing. 
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order, so the officer drew his weapon. (R. 364:69.) Though the officer did admit that in 
his report, he stated that Tony stopped running and put his hands in the air. (R. 364:98.) 
Tony then complied and the officer handcuffed him. (R. 364:69.) The officer testified that 
he asked Tony for consent, and obtained it, to search his person. (R. 364:70-71.) During a 
search of the defendant's pocket, he located an ATM card and Asian currency. (R. 
364:71,74.) Officer Cline testified on direct examination that he searched the defendant's 
pocket initially, but acknowledged that his report said the ATM card was located on the 
second search of the defendant. (R. 364:91.) Tony was bleeding from his left arm, the 
officer said, and he had it wrapped in a pink bandage. (R. 364:75.) Officer Cline collected 
the clothing the defendant was wearing and booked it into evidence. (R. 364:78.) 
During redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Officer Cline to explain to the 
jury the difference between a Terry frisk and a search. Officer Cline responded, in part, 
"Urn, I knew the background of Mr. Duran. I've heard a lot of case information about 
him. Um, and so I thought that he possibly could be armed, committing burglaries et 
cetera. So I did do a pat down frisk of him initially." (R. 364:99-100.) Defense counsel 
did not object at the time to this statement, but subsequently moved for mistrial based on 
the comment. (R. 245-46). The court denied that motion, stating that the officer's 
comment was unsolicited and that he was acting in good faith by trying to respond to the 
question. (R. 362:14.) In addition, the court felt that given the totality of the 
circumstances, the officer needed to explain why he felt he needed to do a pat down 
search. (R. 362:14-15.) Finally, the court felt like evidence of the criminal history was 
"insignificant" compared to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. (R. 362:15.) 
Officer Jensen testified that he drove to the location where Officer Cline had 
caught the defendant and observed Tony lying on the ground. (R. 364:29.) He observed 
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the officer search the defendant as he was lying down and watched him pull an ATM card 
from Tony's pocket. (R. 364:29.) He testified that Tony was not dressed in the same color 
scheme as the individual he had heard reported. (R. 364:29-30.) 
Paul Rimmasch of the Weber County CSI testified that he was called to process 
both scenes for fingerprints. He was able to locate prints at 1391 Kingston and in the 
Ford Bronco II. (R. 364:108-09,114.) The prints matched with several persons: Justin 
Greg Martinez, Rudy Ray Martinez and Leslie Ann Borregio. (R. 364:115-16.) He also 
tested the pink gauze found in the Ford Bronco with the gauze found on the defendant, 
but was not able to find a mechanical fit. (R. 364:120.) 
Detective Robert Buck testified that he took Tony into custody and after giving 
him Miranda warnings, asked him some questions. (R. 365:20.) Tony indicated that he 
did not know why he was there. (R. 365:20.) The officers asked him what he was doing 
in the area and he replied that he was looking for college girls and that when he saw the 
police, he ran because he had warrants. (R. 365:21.) The officer asked him about the 
credit card found in his pocket and Tony indicated that he did not have anything in his 
pocket. (R. 365:21.) Officer Cline, who was present in the room, told the defendant that 
he had taken the card out of his pocket. The prosecutor then asked this question: "What 
did the defendant say after Officer Cline made that statement to the defendant?" The 
officer replied that "At that point he said he didn't know what we were talking about and 
he indicated he wanted to talk to a lawyer before we questioned him further." (R. 
365:22.) The prosecutor asked whether that terminated the conversation and the officer 
said that it did. (R. 365:22.) During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective 
Buck, "And Tony says at this point I'm not going to talk to any - anymore about it. I 
want an attorney." (R. 365:25) The officer replied affirmatively. (R. 365:25.) 
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Ryan Peterson testified that he was working in Kemmerer, Wyoming when he 
received a call from police notifying him that his home at 3639 Iowa was broken into. (R. 
363:31.) He returned home and noticed that his house was "messier." (R. 363:33.) He 
noticed a broken window pane, but did not notice anything immediately missing. (R. 
363:33-34, 38.) A few days later, he noticed that his pants, belt, beanie and shirt were 
missing. (R. 363:38.) He also noticed a pair of green cargo pants that were on the floor 
"like someone had dropped them down and stepped out of them." (R. 363:42.) These 
pants did not belong to him. (R. 363:43.) He also testified that he had lost an America 
First Debit Card as well as some money from the Philippines that his friend had given 
him and which was in the pockets of his pants. (R. 363:36,37,45,47.) Mr. Peterson 
opined that the debit card, pants, belt, shirt, sunglasses and beanie found on the defendant 
were all his property and that he did not give the defendant permission to wear them. (R. 
363:33,39-41,47.) 
Two weeks prior to this incident, on June 11,2007, Officer Tyler Hansen testified 
that he stopped the Ford Bronco II at issue in this case. (R. 363:21.) The driver was a 
Marissa Martinez who was subsequently arrested and the car was impounded. (R. 
363:21.) The officer had no specific memory of items which were in the vehicle. ((R. 
363:23.) Ogden City Police Officer Melissa Melcher testified she inventoried the items 
found in the vehicle. (R. 363:7-8.) These included a photograph of the defendant. (R. 
363:9.) The original photograph had been destroyed, but Ms. Melcher had taken a picture 
of the original. (R. 363:10-11.) The photo had the date of June 10,2098 on it. (R. 
363:12.) Ms. Melcher testified that she took that picture prior to June 28,2007. (R. 
363:17.) Ms. Melcher testified that the vehicle was registered to a Leslie Borrego and that 
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she went and talked with that person. (R. 363:7,15.) Defense counsel objected to the 
admissibility of this photograph and the court denied that objection. (R. 363:10-14.) 
Detective Robert Buck testified that he inventoried the property in the Bronco and 
found that it was all identified as being stolen property. (R. 365:11.) 
On the second to last day of trial, the court stated to both counsel: "Now, let me, 
before we look at jury instructions, it's my understanding that if the jury convicts, the 
question about the habitual criminal and all the enhancements, that is not an issue for the 
jury to decide." (R. 364:127.) Defense counsel stated, "No it is not." (R. 364:127.) The 
prosecutor agreed. The court then said, 
Right. Any enhancements or habitual criminal would simply be a matter for the 
Court rather than the jury? I know at one time it was different than that, but I think 
there's a case out of Provo that decided that's no longer an issue for the jury. But I 
just ~ I wanted to make sure that both sides are in agreement. The only thing they 
are going to decide is guilt or innocence on two Counts of Burglary, two Counts of 
Theft. 
(R. 364:127-28.) The court then asked whether both sides agreed and although no 
one responded on the record, the court then said, "All right." (R. 364:128.) 
After the verdict was rendered, the court asked whether it should release the jury. 
(R. 366:113.) The prosecutor and defense counsel stated that they had nothing further. (R. 
366:113.) The court dismissed the jury and asked counsel what they wanted to do 
regarding the habitual offender provision. (R. 366:114.) The prosecutor opined that it 
ought to be set for sentencing, while defense counsel stated that it was only a "formality" 
and suggested it be done at a law and motion setting, even suggesting that he might 
"stipulate" to the criminal history. (R. 366:114.) Then the following discussion, produced 
verbatim, took place: 
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MR. DAINES: Your Honor has indicated you are certain that this is your Honor's 
decision and not the jury's decision? That's the only thing that worry's me. 
THE COURT: Yeah, no. You mean on the enhancement and the habitual 
criminal? I am fairly confident that it's not a question for the jury anymore. 
Because of that case, and I don't remember the name of it, but it was out of Utah 
County, out of Provo, in which the Court of Appeals said that it's no longer a 
question for the jury it's a matter of law for the Judge to decide. 
MR. DAINES: On the habitual criminal? 
THE COURT: Um hum. And any enhancement that involves prior convictions. 
So, I'll see if I can't track that down. I mean, I thought we discussed that -
MR. DAINES: Well, that was my understanding. 
THE COURT: I thought everybody agreed because I tried to bring it up before we 
started. I didn't want to get to this point and have somebody say whoops, that issue 
should have decided by the jury. 
MR. DAINES: Well, I know you didn't. I haven't read the case personally. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DAINES: I was basically going on what everybody else was saying. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, like I said, if I'm wrong or you're not in agreement 
with that. I don't know what we do to correct it now, because we've let the jury go. 
I mean, that's how I read the law is that it was now — the habitual criminal is now 
a question for the Judge rather than ~ 
MR. DAINES: And that was — that specific issue was the habitual criminal? 
THE COURT: No, it was not. It had to do with enhancements on prior 
convictions. It used to be -
MR. DAINES: Which is what it is. 
THE COURT: Which it is. But they don't specifically use the term habitual 
criminal. They just talk about prior convictions. All right. 
(R. 366:115-17.) 
At the hearing on the motion for mistrial, defense counsel argued that his client 
never affirmatively waived the jury. (R. 362:7.) He then reiterated that there was some 
confusion. "The Court had mentioned it and I may have said something like, well, if 
that's what the State of the law is, I guess that's it." (R. 362:7.) The court then stated its 
recollection of the discussion regarding the habitual offender enhancement: 
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My recollection of what happened here is that before the trial started we 
met in chambers. I met with both counsel in chambers, to discuss the question of 
how to go about handling the habitual criminal. And we were all in agreement that 
we were going to bifurcate the trial. The jury would not know anything at all about 
his prior record. And then when we were in chambers I mentioned something 
about this State versus Palmer case, the one that had been decided about the Court 
of Appeals, and the holding. I said, it seems to me that what they are saying is that 
the jury is not necessarily required to hear evidence when we're talking about 
enhancing penalties. And I asked both attorneys what your position was on this. 
And both said, I'm not sure. I haven't had a chance to read the case. And certainly 
I'm not being critical of anyone. I wanted to give you a chance to look at it, 
because my impression was ~ is that it was taking it away from the jury and that it 
was just an enhancement and there was no reason for a jury to decide that, and 
that's how I perceived the ruling in State versus Palmer at least from the Court of 
Appeals. 
I suggested that both sides take a look at the case, and let me know how 
you wanted to proceed. My impression is, that after we finished the trial, after we 
got the verdict from the jury, neither side raised any objection or requested that I 
keep the jury. In fact, my recollection is I asked is there any reason to keep the 
jury, is there any reason that we need to keep this particular jury after we've had a 
verdict? And I - 1 don't remember anyone, either side saying yes we need to keep 
the jury now to decide the habitual criminal. 
And so, because no one really said anything, I thought it was okay to go 
ahead and release the jury. And I just assumed, I guess, that both sides were in 
agreement with my interpretation of that Palmer case. And now I'm a little 
surprised when the defense asks for a mistrial claiming that the jury should have 
been retained. Because nobody said anything at the conclusion of that trial, when 
the verdict was announced. And frankly if you had said something I may have 
handled it differently. 
(R. 362:16-18.) 
As to the failure to give notice, defense counsel stated his opinion that the 
defendant's failure to give notice prevents him from raising affirmative defenses, but that 
it does not relieve the state of its burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt to 
the jury. (R. 362:8.) 
The court found that the defendant voluntarily waived his right to a jury by "not 
objecting or requesting that I keep the jury to decide the issue of the habitual criminal at 
the time the verdict was rendered." (R. 362:18.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5 mandates that the jury, and not the court, needs to 
make the decision as to whether a person convicted of the underlying offense qualifies as 
a habitually violent offender. The statute is clear on its face and the court failed to follow 
it and erroneously relied on the Palmer decision out of this court for support of its 
mistaken assumption. State v. Palmer. 2009 UT 55,220 P.3d 1198. In addition, the US 
and Utah Constitutions prohibit the court from allowing a defendant to waive a jury by 
his mere acquiescence—the court must obtain an express waiver from the defendant 
himself. See Patton v. United States. 281 U.S. 276,299 (1930). The court never obtained 
a valid waiver from the defendant and as such, was prohibited from dismissing the jury. 
Nor did the defendant's failure to provide notice relieve the state of its burden to prove 
the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt—though it did give the trial court the 
discretion to prevent the defendant from raising certain affirmative defenses to the 
enhancement. In short, the trial court failed to provide the defendant the jury the statute 
requires to determine the habitual violent offender enhancement. 
Second, the trial court erroneously failed to grant the defendant's motion for 
mistrial based on the improper comments made by the police. Officer Cline improperly 
commented on the defendant's criminal history when he indicated he knew the defendant 
had extensive case information and feared he could be armed. Rule 404(b) and Rule 609 
govern the admissibility of prior crime evidence and an improper introduction of prior 
crime evidence has been repeatedly held to be prejudicial and to have significant impact 
on the fairness of the trial. State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738,741 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Daniels. 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); State v. Cox. 787 P.2d 4,7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
fact, the courts have held that even if sufficient evidence to convict exists, the mere 
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mention of a criminal history can, by itself, alter the outcome of the trial and that the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial free of the tainted evidence. State v. Cox. 787 P.2d 4,7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116,1122 (Utah 1989). 
The police also mentioned that the defendant invoked his right to silence. This 
comment prejudicially created an inference that the defendant did not have a valid 
explanation for why he was in possession of the victim's credit card. The law has long 
prohibited using a defendant's invocation of his right to silence to impeach his 
unsatisfactory explanation. Doyle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
Taken together, the introduction of the two prohibited comments: the defendant's 
criminal history and his invocation of his right to silence, the jury certainly would have 
been prejudiced and their verdict certainly would have been affected. 
As such, the defendant is entitled to a new jury trial without the tainted comments 
and to have the habitual violent offender enhancement tried to the jury if he is convicted. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRONSEOULY FAILED TO PROVIDE THE 
DEFENDANT A JURY TO DECIDE THE HABITUAL OFFENDER 
ENHANCEMENT, 
Several times during the trial, the court stated that it, and not the jury, had the 
province of trying the habitual violent offender enhancement. This was erroneous. 
The habitual violent offender enhancement statute is found in Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-203.5. This statute mandates that "[i]f a person is convicted in this state of a violent 
felony by plea or by verdict and the trier of fact determines beyond a reasonable doubt 
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that the person is a habitual violent offender" then the penalty is enhanced from a third or 
second degree felony to a first degree felony and first degree felonies are subject to 
enhanced penalties. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5(2) (emphasis added). Habitually 
violent offenders are those who have been convicted at least twice previously of several 
listed violent offenses. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5(l)(b). 
Under the statute, the prosecutor has a duty to provide notice in the information 
that they intend to seek a habitually violent offender enhancement. Id. at (3)(a). The 
notice shall contain the "case number, court, and date of conviction or commitment relied 
upon by the prosecution." IcL If the defendant seeks to raise an affirmative defense to the 
habitually violent offender enhancement, then he must provide notice to the prosecution 
five days prior to trial, detailing one of three scenarios: 1) his denial that he is the person 
charged, 2) his denial that he was represented by counsel at the prior conviction or 3) his 
denial that the plea was voluntarily given. IcL at (3)(b). If the defendant enters one of 
these denials, then the jury may not be told of the enhancement until after a guilty verdict. 
Idat(4)(a). 
"If the juryfs verdict is guilty, the defendant shall be tried regarding the allegation 
of being an habitual violent offender by the same jury, if practicable, unless the 
defendant waives the jury, in which case the allegation shall be tried immediately to the 
court." Id. at (4)(b) (emphasis added). 
This statute "does not create a new crime" and has been held to be constitutional. 
Grvger v.Burke, 334 U.S. 728,732 (1948); State v. Carter. 578 P.2d 1275,1277 (Utah 
1978). Its purpose is to "make persistent offenders subject to greater sanctions." State v. 
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Montague. 671 P.2d 187,190 (Utah 1983). See also. State v. Bailey. 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 
1985) (finding no double jeopardy violation). 
The state bears the burden to prove the prior convictions: 
To be specific, when a defendant is charged as an habitual criminal, the State bears 
the burden of proving the prior conviction, sentencing, and commitment as 
required by section 76-8-1001. A previous judgment of conviction so proven is 
entitled to a presumption of regularity, including a presumption that the defendant 
was represented by counsel. This presumption satisfies any initial burden the State 
may have of proving that the defendant had or knowingly waived counsel. After 
proof of the previous conviction is introduced, the burden is on the defendant to 
raise the issue and produce some evidence that he or she was not represented by 
counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel. Once the defendant has presented 
some evidence, the presumption of regularity is rebutted and the burden shifts to 
the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was in 
fact represented or knowingly waived representation. 
State v.Triptow. 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989). 
The statute is quite clear on its face. The legislature requires the trier of fact to 
make the determination that the person is a habitual violent offender and that burden must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5(2), 
(4)(b). There is only one exception to having the same jury try the habitual violent 
offender enhancement, and that is if the defendant affirmatively waives the jury. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5(4)(b). At no point during the record did the defendant 
affirmatively waive his right to have the enhancement tried to the jury. 
The defendant came closest to a waiver when he acquiesced to the court's release 
of the jury after the guilty verdict. Coupled with defense counsel's assertion that he had 
nothing further to raise, it appears that there might have been a waiver. 
Nonetheless, the standard is much higher. As the United States Supreme Court has 
articulated: 
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[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there 
has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, 
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused. 
Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938). The standard of a knowing and intelligent 
waiver applies in order to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218,236 (1973). This has included a right to a jury trial. Adams v. 
United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). 
Specifically, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an 
accused the right to a trial by jury, as does Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. US 
Const. Amend VI, Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. "In the absence of a valid consent the district 
court cannot proceed except with a jury, not because a jury is necessary to its jurisdiction, 
but because the accused is entitled by the terms of the Constitution to that mode of trial." 
Patton v. United States. 281 U.S. 276,299 (1930). In Patton, the Supreme Court dealt 
with the question as to whether the Constitution prohibited the defendants from waiving 
their right to a 12 person jury. All defendants had waived the right on the record, 
individually and with the advice of counsel. kL at 286-87. The court held that they could 
validly waive their right to a jury, but certain safeguards had to be guaranteed: 
Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be 
jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in 
criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, 
before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and 
the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent 
consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be 
discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an 
eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any 
of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the 
offenses dealt with increase in gravity. 
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14 at 312-13. 
At no point during the trial did the defendant validly waive his right to a jury trial 
on the habitual offender enhancement. The court never questioned him to ask him 
whether he was waiving this right. On top of this, there clearly was significant confusion 
regarding this issue. On the second to last day of trial, the court told both counsel, on the 
record, that this "is not an issue for the jury to decide." (R. 364:127.) While both counsel 
seemed to agree with the court, they certainly were taking cues from it. After the verdict 
was rendered, the court again stated its opinion, based on the Palmer case, that it should 
make the determination. ("I am fairly confident that it's not a question for the jury 
anymore." (R. 366:115.)) The prosecutor, in essence, asked the court whether it was 
confident in that answer, stating that he was not familiar with the case. (R. 366:115-17.) 
The court said that the case discussed prior convictions, not specifically the habitual 
offender enhancement. (R. 366:117.) Defense counsel was silent during this exchange. 
While defense counsel did state that he had "nothing further" when the jury was 
released, there was not an affirmative waiver of the right to jury by either counsel or the 
defendant. As the Supreme Court has articulated, the standard for waiver of a jury trial is 
not silence and is not acquiescence. Patton v. United States. 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 (1930). 
There must be "the express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Id. 
The court's ruling also conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's recent enunciation 
of the law on a related issue in State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55,220 P.3d 1198. In Palmer, 
the defendant was convicted of DUI and his sentence was enhanced based on two prior 
convictions. Id. at 55 4-5. He argued that he had a constitutional right to a jury finding on 
the sentencing enhancement. Id at 5 6. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that 
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Palmer's contentions about his prior convictions were not factual issues, but legal ones. 
Id. at J 15. "In this case, Palmer has not asked that the jury determine the fact of his prior 
conviction; that is, he has not asked to have a jury determine whether he was previously 
convicted of two DUIs." WL Because of his failure to allege a factual dispute, the 
Supreme Court said that he did not implicate jury trial rights. Id. 
Yet, the Palmer case should be limited in several respects. First, it dealt with a 
DUI enhancement statute, which is entirely different than the one at hand. The DUI 
statute in Palmer did not contain a provision about where the enhancement should be 
tried. Whereas, the statute in this case specifically mandates a jury trial on the 
enhancement issue. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5(2) and (4)(b). Second, as the 
Supreme Court enunciated, "During sentencing, after a defendant has been charged and 
convicted, he continues to have the right to a jury determination of any fact (other than 
[a] prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for [the] crime." State v. 
Palmer. 2009 UT 55,5 12,220 P.3d 1198 (internal quotation omitted). See also. 
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466,489 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") This 
case, although it involves prior convictions, is entirely different from the Palmer case 
because the Legislature clearly has decided to treat this enhancement as a separate 
element—they said it expressly two times in the statute. As the Supreme Court made 
clear in the Apprendi decision (in which a defendant's enhancement was tried to the court 
instead of the jury): 
At stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the 
proscription of any deprivation of liberty without "due process of law," Amdt. 14, 
and the guarantee that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
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right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury," Amdt. 6. Taken together, 
these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to "a jury determination that 
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,476-77 (2000). Trial by jury, the Apprendi court 
said, involves "the truth of every accusation". Id The Utah Legislature clearly chose to 
treat this enhancement as a jury issue—they contemplated it as an element of the offense 
and not as a simple sentence enhancement, or they would not have clearly expressed such 
in the statute. The DUI statute in Palmer, on the other hand, was silent on this issue. 
Third, this statute is much broader than mere prior convictions: it requires the jury to 
determine that the defendant is a "habitually violent offender." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.5 defines this as: "a person convicted within the state of any violent felony and who 
on at least two previous occasions has been convicted of a violent felony and committed 
to either prison in Utah or an equivalent correctional institution of another state or of the 
United States either at initial sentencing or after revocation of probation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.5(l)(b). This definition clearly requires some factual determination 
beyond the existence of prior convictions. The statute also requires the jury to look at a 
list of applicable offenses which are constituted as "violent felonies." Id. at (l)(c). The 
statute clearly contemplates an evidentiary hearing: "The trier of fact shall consider any 
evidence presented at trial and the prosecution and the defendant shall be afforded an 
opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence." Id. at (4)(c)(2). The state must 
prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at (4)(c)(iii). In short, the habitual 
violent offender enhancement was clearly meant to be tried to a jury using the standard 
rules of evidence with standard burdens of proof and is completely different from the 
DUI statute at issue in Palmer which merely looked to whether the defendant had been 
convicted of DUI on two prior occasions. 
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The trial court in this case dismissed the jury and defense counsel filed a motion 
for mistrial, asking the court for a jury trial on the habitual offender enhancement. The 
court opined that it was now too late to try the enhancement to the jury: "There's not 
going to be another jury." (R. 362:20.) The state mentioned that the statute contemplated 
bringing in another jury. (R. 362:20.) The court disagreed, stating that the defendant had 
waived the right to a jury. (R. 362:21.) Yet, at trial, the prosecutor was correct when he 
mentioned that the statute contemplated bringing in another jury: it says that the same 
jury shall try the enhancement, "if practicable." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5(4)(b). The 
converse would be true: if it is not practicable, then the court shall use a different jury. 
One would not be able to read into the statute that if a situation arose in which it would 
not be practicable to use the "same jury" that one would not use a jury at all. That reading 
contradicts the legislature's use of the word "same" in the sentence. "Not practicable" 
clearly modifies "same": if it is not practicable to use the same jury. It would be 
completely incongruous to read the statute to deny the defendant the right to a jury trial 
on this issue if it is not practicable to use the same jury. The statute clearly contemplates 
bringing in another jury, as the state suggested to the court. In fact, the defendant 
preserved this argument with enough time for the court to correct this error. Yet, it failed 
to do so and confused the matter even further by emphatically stating that the defendant 
had no right to a trial. 
Finally, the state argued to the trial court that the defendant waived the ability to 
challenge the habitual violent offender enhancement because he failed to file notice as 
required by statute. (R. 257-269.) This represents a clear misreading of the statute. The 
statute says, 
27 
The defendant shall serve notice in writing upon the prosecutor if the defendant 
intends to deny that: 
(A) the defendant is the person who was convicted or committed; 
(B) the defendant was represented by counsel or had waived counsel; or 
(C) the defendant's plea was understandingly or voluntarily entered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5(3)(b) (emphasis added). The key and operative word here 
is the word, "if." If the defendant intends to make one of the three denials listed, then he 
has an obligation to notify the prosecutor. This makes logical sense. The prosecutor 
would need proper time to subpoena witnesses or get further records in order to rebut the 
defendant's claims. But this is a narrow list of circumstances and certainly does not 
provide the prosecution with the opportunity to skip out on its burden. This would be 
akin to an alibi defense. The defendant must provide notice if he intends to raise an alibi 
defense, otherwise, he risks losing the ability to present that evidence. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-14-2 (2010). Yet, if the defendant fails to give notice, the state would not be 
relieved of its burden to prove the underlying offense. In the alibi statute, the defendant 
may still testify about his own alibi and the court "may" exclude that evidence. Id. at (3). 
Similarly, in this case, if the defendant fails to give notice to the prosecution, then the 
court may deny him the ability to put on one of the three listed defenses. Yet, the state 
would still have the obligation to prove the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt and 
to prove that enhancement to the jury. 
In summary, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied him the 
right to a jury trial on the habitual violent offender enhancement. The defendant never 
affirmatively waived his right to have this enhancement tried to the jury. In fact, he 
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asserted it in time for the court to correct the problem. The state clearly requires this 
enhancement to be tried to the jury and the court erred in making this finding itself. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED MR, QURAN'S 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL BECAUSE THE POLICE IMPROPERLY 
COMMENTED ON THE DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY 
AND INVOCATION OF HIS RIGHT TO SILENCE, 
Police officers made two significant comments which would have prejudiced the 
jury against Mr. Duran which were not corrected by the court. This was erroneous. First, 
Officer Cline testified that he "knew the background of Mr. Duran. I've heard a lot of 
case information about him. Um, and so I thought that he possibly could be armed, 
committing burglaries et cetera. So I did do a pat down frisk of him initially." (R. 364:99-
100.) Second, when Detective Buck interviewed the defendant, he testified that he asked 
him how he obtained Mr. Peterson's card at which point Tony "said he didn't know what 
we were talking about and he indicated he wanted to talk to a lawyer before we 
questioned him further." (R. 365:22.) 
A. The Officer's Reference to Mr. Quran's Criminal History Was Prejudicial 
"Improper introduction of evidence of a defendant's past criminal record is ground 
for a new trial. Cautionary instructions will not cure the error. Marshall v. United States, 
360 U.S. 310 (1959); United States v. Tomaiolo. 249 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1957); United 
States v.Jacangelo. 281 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1960); Helton v. United States. 221 F.2d 338 
(5th Cir. 1955)." United States v. Rinaldi. 301 F.2d 576,578 (2d Cir. 1962) (internal 
citations corrected and omitted). See also United States v. Fermin. 32 F.3d 674,677 (2d 
Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1170 (1995) (citations omitted). "The general rule here 
applicable is that the erroneous admission of a defendant's prior conviction ordinarily 
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warrants a new trial. See United States v. Figueroa. 618 F.2d 934,944 (2d Cir. 1980)." 
United States v. Pagan. 721 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1983). 
The Utah Courts have frequently stated that evidence of prior crimes may not be 
admitted if their purpose "is to disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with a 
propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed the crime charged." State 
v.Daniels. 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978). This is based on Rule 404(b) of the Rules of 
Evidence, which prohibits introduction of other crimes unless relevant for another 
purpose in the trial. Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The introduction of a criminal history is 
"presumed prejudicial" and should not be admitted into evidence. State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738,741 (Utah 1985). "The evidence of the prior crimes presumptively ha[s] a 
strong tendency to suggest to the jury that defendant was guilty of the charged crime." 
State v. Cox. 787 P.2d 4,7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
The state may have independent, non-tainted evidence sufficient to prove a 
defendant's guilt, yet the jury may still be tainted enough to alter the decision. Id. See 
also. State v.Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116,1122 (Utah 1989) (A defendant is entitled to a new 
trial without untainted evidence and "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted 
evidence to support a verdict.") 
The trial court failed to engage in any sort of analysis under Rule 404(b) to 
determine whether this evidence had been inappropriately entered. "[A]dmission of prior 
crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper 
exercise of that discretion. In other words, failure of a trial court to undertake a 
scrupulous examination in connection with the admission of prior bad act evidence 
constitutes an abuse of discretion." State v. Webster. 2001 UT App 238,5 11, 32 P.3d 
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976 (quotations and citations omitted and emphasis added) See also. State v. DeCorso. 
1999 UT 57,5 18,993 P.2d 837. No such examination took place in this case. The court 
merely opined that because evidence of guilt was overwhelming and that it appeared that 
the officer was merely trying to respond to the proseuctor's question, the evidence should 
have been admitted. (R. 362:14-15.) This did not constitute a scrupulous examination of 
the evidence under rule 404(b). 
Not only did the trial court in this case fail to look at the officer's comment under 
a Rule 404(b) analysis, but it also failed to make a finding regarding the prior 
conviction's admissibility under Rule 403. As the court explain in Figueroa: 
A prior conviction is material to a defendant's intent (when intent is in issue), but 
it is also prejudicial to the extent that it also tends to prove a defendant's 
propensity to commit crimes. When material evidence has an additional 
prejudicial effect, Rule 403 requires the trial court to make a conscientious 
assessment of whether the probative value of the evidence on a disputed issue in 
the case is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial tendency of the evidence to 
have some other adverse effect upon the defendant. 
United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934,943 (2d Cir. 1980). In Utah, to reemphasize, 
these comments are presumed to be prejudicial and the trial court needed to engage in an 
analysis under rule 403. See State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738,741 (Utah 1985). See also. 
State v. Cox. 787 P.2d 4,5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("The court must balance the probative 
value of such evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice.") (emphasis added); State 
v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424,427 (Utah 1989) (trial court should "admit the evidence of 
other crimes only after it had conducted a careful weighing of the probative value and 
potential prejudicial effect of the evidence pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence 403.") 
(emphasis added). Nothing of the sort happened in this case. The trial court made no 
inquiry as to whether this evidence was inherently prejudicial and what probative effect it 
would have. The defendant submits that there would be no probative value in mentioning 
31 
the defendant's criminal history to the jury, and in fact, it has a massive tendency, as has 
already been explained to prejudice the jury. As already emphasized, it is presumptively 
prejudicial. 
In a Florida case, a former police chief was allegedly robbed at gunpoint by the 
defendant. Henderson v. Florida. 789 So.2d 1016 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000). While testifying 
about the robbery, the witness was asked what the defendant was doing. He responded 
that "[h]e knew what he was doing, so I figured he had done this before." IdL at 1017. The 
state conceded in that case that the comment was improper, but not mistriable. Id. at 
1017-18. The court disagreed, citing Cornatezer v. Florida, 736 So.2d 1217,1218 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1999). 
The prospect of the state submitting evidence to the jury that a defendant has been 
previously convicted of committing an unrelated crime is often so vital to the 
outcome of a trial that it is the focus of defense counsel's trial strategy. For 
example, in order to avoid the likely emphasis that jurors will place on such 
evidence, defendants often decline to exercise their right to testify so that evidence 
of their prior criminal conduct cannot be introduced by the state. The improper 
introduction of evidence concerning the defendant's prior criminal history is 
oftentimes too prejudicial for the jury to disregard, notwithstanding the issuance of 
a curative instruction. 
Id. at 1218 (mention by officer that defendant was a convicted felon). The Florida courts 
have well-established the reasoning behind why these type of comments are mistriable: 
[T]he above inadmissible evidence was too powerful, too damning, and too 
prejudicial for any conscientious jury to disregard pursuant to the above jury 
charge. Cautionary instructions of this sort have their place in our law, but are 
utterly ineffective when applied, as here, to such powerful prejudicial evidence. 
Compare Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). "The danger of a 
miscarriage of justice lies in the real possibility that, in spite of correct 
instructions, the [prior] conviction, irrelevant to the [present] count, will negate 
any reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt..., that he will be convicted 'on 
principle.'" Walker v. Superior Court. 37 Cal.App.3d 938,112 CaLRptr. 767,769 
n.l (1974). 
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... We are further supported by the clear weight of authority in the country on this 
subject which has addressed the issue in depth. State v. Middleton, 362 A.2d 602 
(1976), aff d., 379 A.2d 453 (N J. 1977); Commonwealth v. Carroll. 418 A.2d 702 
(1980); Walker v.Superior Court. 37 Cal App.3d 938 (1974); 
Vazquez v. Florida. 405 So.2d 177,180 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981) (internal citation omitted). 
The officer's statement that he had "heard a lot of case information about" the 
defendant was clearly prejudicial. This is powerful, extremely prejudicial information. It 
is very possible the defendant failed to testify precisely because he did not want the jury 
to hear about this criminal history. The mere mention that he had this history has a strong 
tendency to change the entire verdict. And as the courts have explained, even if there 
were sufficient evidence for a conviction outside of the tainted evidence, it is still 
"irrelevant" because there is a strong likelihood that the verdict would be affected by the 
improper introduction of inadmissible character evidence. State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 
1116,1122 (Utah 1989). 
B. The Officer's Comment on Mr, Quran's Exercise of his Right to Silence 
Constituted Error 
It is well settled that a clear violation of the accused's constitutional right against 
self-incrimination results from references to accused's silence while in police custody. 
Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1964); Griffen v. California. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
In Doyle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held that the use for 
impeachment purposes of a defendant's exercise of his right to silence violates due 
process. On cross examination of the defendants in Doyle, the prosecution challenged 
defendants' exculpatory explanation by questioning why defendants did not tell the 
arresting officer their story of innocence. The inference was that silence equaled guilt 
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because an innocent person would have immediately told the exculpatory story. See also 
State v. Maas. 1999 UT App 325,991 P.2d 1108. 
Doyle rests on "the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his 
silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an explanation 
subsequently offered at trial." Greer v. Miller. 483 U.S. 756 (1987). Further, the court 
said "it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to 
call attention to [the defendant's] silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he 
did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an 
unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony." Id. at 619. 
Continued attempts by the prosecutor to elicit such testimony amount to prosecutorial 
misconduct. State v. Wiswell. 639 P.2d 146,147 (Utah 1981). 
In State v. Urias. 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980), the court noted, "when a person 
invokes his constitutional rights, the prosecution should not comment thereon, nor so use 
it in any way that will tend to impair or destroy that privilege." See also State v. Lewis. 
927 P.2d 235 (Wis. 1996); State v. Easter. 992 P.2d 1285 (Wis. 1996)). Therefore, "[a] 
police witness may not comment on the silence of the defendant so as to infer guilt from 
a refusal to answer questions." State v. Lewis. 130 Wn.2d at 705; State v. Easter. 130 
Wn.2d at 236. See also United States v. Barton. 731 F.2d 669,674 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(holding prosecutor's comment on missing explanation where it could only have come 
from the accused constituted an impermissible comment on Fifth Amendment privilege); 
State v. Garcia. 887 P.2d 767,771-73 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 889 P.2d 203 
(N.M. 1995); State v. Hennessv. 837 P.2d 1366,1368-73 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), cert, 
denied. 835 P.2d 80 (N.M. 1992). 
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As the Utah Supreme Court has said, "The prosecution may not in general refer to 
or elicit testimony regarding an accused's exercise of the rights to counsel and silence 
after arrest. See Dovle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 610,617-20 (1976); State v. Wiswell. 639 P.2d 
146,147 (Utah 1981)." State v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45; 979 P.2d 799 (internal citation 
omitted). 
At no point during the trial did defense counsel object to the introduction of this 
testimony. Mr. Duran contends that despite the fact that this specific error was not 
litigated, that this court may review it for plain error. State v. Smit 2004 UT App 222,5 
26,95 P.3d 1203. "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing (i) 
an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful ."Id at 5 28. 
First, as referenced above, it was clearly erroneous for the officer to comment on 
the fact that the defendant exercised his right to silence. The caselaw clearly indicates 
that comments against a defendant may prejudice a defendant. Second, it should have 
been obvious to the trial court—the United States Supreme Court has stated for nearly 
four decades that the police may not comment on an invocation of rights. The court 
should have been aware of the error. Third, the error was clearly harmful. This case 
depends entirely on context. The prosecutor asked the witness what the defendant's 
explanation was for having the victim's card on his person. (R. 365:22.) He then said the 
defendant asked for an attorney. (R. 365:22.) The effect of the jury hearing about this 
statement would be to assume that he had something to hide by not talking. The 
prosecutor could have no other reason for asking this question, especially since the 
prosecutor would have to have known that the only answer to that question would be that 
the defendant exercised his right to remain silent. He could not ask the question to gain 
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any information because there was none to give other than the defendant's silence. There 
can only be one explanation for soliciting silence—to imply the defendant had something 
to hide or did not want to confess to the police. Though there are completely innocent 
reasons for choosing to be silent, the effect can be disastrous. This is why the courts 
prohibit use of silence against a defendant. 
The defendant is aware of State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) in which 
the Supreme Court held that the "mere mention" of an invocation of rights does not 
constitute reversible error. In fact, 
a Doyle violation involves more than simply referring to a defendant's post-
Miranda silence. A prosecutor must specifically inquire about or argue using a 
defendant's exercise of his rights in a context that would impeach a defendant's 
exculpatory explanation of his conduct. Furthermore, in evaluating whether the 
disclosure of a defendant's exercise of his Miranda rights is a Doyle violation, a 
court must look at the particular use to which the disclosure is put, and the context 
of the disclosure. The State must, in some way, use the defendant's silence to 
undermine the exercise of those rights guaranteed . . . before it can be said that 
such rights have been violated. 
State v. Demartinis, 2008 UT App 261,6 (memorandum decision) (quoting portions of 
Harmon. 956 P.2d at 268) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
Mr. Duran believes that this violation, though a mere comment by the officer was 
not a "mere mention" of Mr. Duran's invocation of his rights. The prosecutor, as already 
argued, would have no legitimate purpose or reason to ask this question—it was solicited 
solely to undermine Mr. Duran's invocation of his rights and create the impression that 
he was hiding information from the police. This is precisely what the court was trying to 
prohibit in Doyle. There was not a positive context for this type of comment—it was 
intentionally solicited by the prosecutor who affirmatively asked what the defendant's 
explanation was for possessing the credit card. The implication was clear: he did not have 
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an explanation and he is guilty. While the prosecutor did not argue to the jury this 
implication, he specifically inquired about it in a context which tended to impeach the 
defendant. The defendant explained that he did not have the card. Then the officers 
confronted him about how they claimed to have found it on him. The prosecutor then 
solicited the defendant's silence in order to imply that he did not have an explanation 
other than guilt. This comment can be nothing more than the exact type of violation 
Doyle meant to prohibit—using a defendant's silence to impeach his already given 
explanation. Mr. Duran did not have a good explanation, so his silence can be used to 
infer guilt. 
Mr. Duran contends that taken together, these comments were especially 
disastrous. The first comment referenced the defendant's criminal history. The second 
comment referenced his invocation of his right to silence. The figurative "one-two" 
punch would have left the jury with this impression: the defendant is a multiple-offender 
with a history significant enough to warrant the officer's fear that he was armed; and that 
the defendant had something to hide so he didn't cooperate with the police. Neither of 
these inferences would have been permissible under the rules of evidence. Both 
violations are of constitutional importance: a defendant's right to due process is violated 
if the jury punishes him because of his past history and a defendant's right to remain 
silent is violated if his silence is used against him. It is a fear of these improper inferences 
which prompted the enactment of Rules 403,404 and 609—all of which were violated by 
the introduction of this testimony. 
These errors, when considered together, would have deprived the defendant of a 
fair trial because there is a strong likelihood the jury would have convicted Mr. Duran 
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based solely on his supposed prior criminal history and his exercise of his right to remain 
silent. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Duran asks this court find that the trial court 
erred in failing to try the habitual violent offender enhancement to the jury and that it 
erred in denying his motion for mistrial based on officer commentary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this s. / 3 day of May, 2010. 
SAMUEL P. NEWTON 
Attune}) for the Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5 
Habitual violent offender ~ Definition -
Procedure -- Penalty. 
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76-3-203.5. Habitual violent offender - Definition ~ Procedure - Penalty. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Felony" means any violation of a criminal statute of the state, any other state, the 
United States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States for which the 
maximum punishment the offender may be subjected to exceeds one year in prison. 
(b) "Habitual violent offender" means a person convicted within the state of any violent 
felony and who on at least two previous occasions has been convicted of a violent felony and 
committed to either prison in Utah or an equivalent correctional institution of another state or of 
the United States either at initial sentencing or after revocation of probation. 
(c) "Violent felony" means: 
(i) any of the following offenses, or any attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit 
any of the following offenses punishable as a felony: 
(A) aggravated arson, arson, knowingly causing a catastrophe, and criminal mischief, 
Tide 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, Property Destruction; 
(B) assault by prisoner, Section 76-5-102.5; 
(C) disarming a police officer, Section 76-5-102.8; 
(D) aggravated assault, Section 76-5-103; 
(E) aggravated assault by prisoner, Section 76-5-103.5; 
(F) mayhem, Section 76-5-105; 
(G) stalking, Subsection 76-5-106.5(2) or (3); 
(H) threat of terrorism, Section 76-5-107.3; 
(I) child abuse, Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a) or (b); 
(J) commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child, Section 76-5-109.1; 
(K) abuse or neglect of disabled child, Section 76-5-110; 
(L) abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult, Section 76-5-111; 
(M) endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult, Section 76-5-112.5; 
(N) criminal homicide offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2, Criminal Homicide; 
(O) kidnapping, child kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping under Tide 76, Chapter 5, 
Part 3, Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Smuggling; 
(P) rape, Section 76-5-402; 
(Q) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(R) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2; 
(S) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; 
(T) forcible sodomy, Section 76-5-403; 
(U) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
(V) forcible sexual abuse, Section 76-5-404; 
(W) aggravated sexual abuse of a child or sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1; 
(X) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
(Y) sexual exploitation of a minor, Section 76-5a-3; 
(Z) aggravated burglary and burglary of a dwelling under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2, 
Burglary and Criminal Trespass; 
(AA) aggravated robbery and robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery; 
(BB) theft by extortion under Subsection 76-6-406(2)(a) or (b); 
(CC) tampering with a witness under Subsection 76-8-508(1); 
(DD) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant under Section 76-8-508.3; 
(EE) tampering with a juror under Subsection 76-8-508.5(2)(c); 
(FF) extortion to dismiss a criminal proceeding under Section 76-8-509 if by any threat 
or by use of force theft by extortion has been committed pursuant to Subsections 76-6-406(2)(a), 
(b), and (i); 
(GG) possession, use, or removal of explosive, chemical, or incendiary devices under 
Subsections 76-10-306(3) through (6); 
(HH) unlawful delivery of explosive, chemical, or incendiary devices under Section 76-
10-307; 
(II) purchase or possession of a dangerous weapon or handgun by a restricted person 
under Section 76-10-503; 
(JJ) unlawful discharge of a firearm under Section 76-10-508; 
(KK) aggravated exploitation of prostitution under Subsection 76-10-1306(l)(a); 
(LL) bus hijacking under Section 76-10-1504; and 
(MM) discharging firearms and hurling missiles under Section 76-10-1505; or 
(ii) any felony violation of a criminal statute of any other state, the United States, or any 
district, possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a violent felony as 
defined in this Subsection (1) if committed in this state. 
(2) If a person is convicted in this state of a violent felony by plea or by verdict and the 
trier of fact determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a habitual violent offender 
under this section, the penalty for a: 
(a) third degree felony is as if the conviction were for a first degree felony; 
(b) second degree felony is as if the conviction were for a first degree felony; or 
(c) first degree felony remains the penalty for a first degree penalty except: 
(i) the convicted person is not eligible for probation; and 
(ii) the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider that the convicted person is a habitual 
violent offender as an aggravating factor in determining the length of incarceration. 
(3) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall provide 
notice in the information or indictment that the defendant is subject to punishment as a habitual 
violent offender under this section. Notice shall include the case number, court, and date of 
conviction or commitment of any case relied upon by the prosecution. 
(b) (i) The defendant shall serve notice in writing upon the prosecutor if the defendant 
intends to deny that: 
(A) the defendant is the person who was convicted or committed; 
(B) the defendant was represented by counsel or had waived counsel; or 
(C) the defendant's plea was understanding^ or voluntarily entered. 
(ii) The notice of denial shall be served not later than five days prior to trial and shall 
state in detail the defendant's contention regarding the previous conviction and commitment. 
(4) (a) If the defendant enters a denial under Subsection (3)(b) and if the case is tried to a 
jury, the jury may not be told until after it returns its verdict on the underlying felony charge, of 
the: 
(i) defendant's previous convictions for violent felonies, except as otherwise provided in 
the Utah Rules of Evidence; or 
(ii) allegation against the defendant of being a habitual violent offender. 
(b) If the jury's verdict is guilty, the defendant shall be tried regarding the allegation of 
being an habitual violent offender by die same jury, if practicable, unless the defendant waives 
the jury, in which case the allegation shall be tried immediately to the court. 
(c) (i) Prior to or at the time of sentencing the trier of fact shall determine if this section 
applies. 
(ii) The trier of fact shall consider any evidence presented at trial and the prosecution and 
the defendant shall be afforded an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence. 
(iii) Prior to sentencing under this section, the trier of fact shall determine whether this 
section is applicable beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(d) If any previous conviction and commitment is based upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest, there is a rebuttable presumption that the conviction and commitment were regular and 
lawful in all respects if the conviction and commitment occurred after January 1,1970. If the 
conviction and commitment occurred prior to January 1,1970, the burden is on the prosecution 
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was then represented by 
counsel or had lawfully waived the right to have counsel present, and that the defendant's plea 
was understanding^ and voluntarily entered. 
(e) If the trier of fact finds this section applicable, the court shall enter that specific 
finding on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment that the 
defendant has been found by the trier of fact to be a habitual violent offender and is sentenced 
under this section. 
(5) (a) The sentencing enhancement provisions of Section 76-3-407 supersede the 
provisions of this section. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), the "violent felony" offense defined in Subsection 
(l)(c) shall include any felony sexual offense violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual 
Offenses, to determine if the convicted person is a habitual violent offender. 
(6) The sentencing enhancement described in this section does not apply if: 
(a) the offense for which the person is being sentenced is: 
(i) a grievous sexual offense; 
(ii) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; 
(iii) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302; or 
(iv) forcible sexual abuse, Section 76-5-404; and 
(b) applying the sentencing enhancement provided for in this section would result in a 
lower maximum penalty than the penalty provided for under the section that describes the 
offense for which the person is being sentenced. 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 403,404(b) and 609 
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Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, 
or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; 
other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall 
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of 
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the 
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
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(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction 
is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, 
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a 
subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, 
or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible 
under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile 
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be 
admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in 
evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of 
a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
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D O 
CHARGES )^S 
3. BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony iWs 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/26/2009 Guilty |3S3 
4. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony |^S 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/26/2009 Guilty *!pll 
5. HABITUAL VIOLENT OFFENDER - Not Applicable tS==s 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/06/2009 Guilty sSKJ^ 
HEARING 
COUNT: 9:23 
This is the time set for oral arguments hearing regarding the 
habitual criminal penalty enhancement. Attorney William Daines is 
present representing the State of Utah. Attorney H. Don Sharp is 
present representing the Defendant, who is also 
present in custody from the Weber County Jail. Attorney Daines 
offers State's exhibit #1. Attorney Sharp has no objection to the 
exhibit, and the Court receives exhibit #1. Counsel submit the 
issue for decision without further argument. The Court 
finds the Defendant is a habitual criminal beyond reasonable 
doubt. Attorney Daines indicates that the State does not intend to 
request another jury trial on counts 1 and 2, and Mr. Daines moves 
to dismiss those counts. The Court grants the motion 
and counts 1 and 2 are dismissed. The Court previously received a 
presentence investigation report on counts 3 and 4, and the Court 
determines that sentencing should proceed. 
COUNT: 9:38 
Attorney Sharp addresses the Court regarding sentencing. 
Page 1 
Case No: 071901496 
Date: .Oct 06, 2009 
COUNT: 9:41 
The Defendant addresses the Court. 
COUNT: 9:44 
Attorney Daines addresses the Court. Judge Jones sentences the 
Defendant to a term of 5 years up to which may be for life at the 
Utah State Prison on count 3, and 0-5 years at the Utah State 
Prison on count 4. The sentence for each 
count may run concurrently and credit for all time the Defendant 
has previously served in this case is authorized. It should be 
clarified (Judge Jones also further clarified this issue off the 
record) that Defendant is not sentenced to additional prison 
time for the habitual criminal penalty enhancement. The jury 
convicted the Defendant on counts 3 and 4, and the amended 
information charged those counts as a first degree felony and a 
third degree felony, respectively. However, the degree 
of the offense was not listed on the verdict forms. The Court 
finds that burglary of a dwelling is not a first degree felony but 
is a second degree felony, and the habitual criminal penalty 
enhancement bumps that charge to a first degree felony for 
sentencing. Therefore, the habitual criminal penalty enhancement 
has already been applied when sentencing the Defendant to 5 years 
to life on count 3. The Court also finds that the penalty 
enhancement does not apply to a non-violent felony, which 
count 4 is. The habitual criminal penalty enhancement has 
therefore not been applied to count 4. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 1st Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence for each charge shall run concurrently, and credit for 
all time previously served is authorized. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
JUAN JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
ANTHONY JOSEPH DURAN 
FRANK LUCERO 
ANTHONY DELGADO DURAN 
JOSEPH DELGADO 
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